Security Threat to Europe

If the majority of this manuscript was spent on Russian history it is because we deemed it essential that readers fully understand all that drives Russia.  Treating this the Russian Orthodox Church’s Threat to European Security and Democracy without the context of history would be akin to a doctor examining a tumor without understanding the human body.  It would be an exercise in knowledge for the medical researcher but near meaningless to the treating physician treating the suffering experienced by the patient. 

It is different for the Russian people and those who know the state all too well having suffered its colonialism, occupations and their attending misery.  Russians have always understood their government and the Russian Orthodox Church’s inclination to establish and maintain itself at the expense of others.  In the 19^th century, while the Russian Orthodox Church was still undeniably, firmly entrenched as a creature of the Russian State, Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin wrote:

“Any honest thinking Russian is bound to realize that our empire cannot change its attitude to the people.  By its very existence it is doomed to be its blood-sucker and tormentor.  The people instinctively hate it, and it cannot help but oppress the people, since its whole being and strength are founded on the people’s misery… The only worthwhile constitution from the people’s point of view is the destruction of the empire.”[1]

There were many Russians who shared that same point of view since Putin rose to power.  Through general repression including the ‘Foreign Agents Act’ that sought to ban civil society activities, dissent has all but disappeared in Russia.[2]  A recent example of how forcibly Russia deals with dissent can be found in the case of 19 year old Dariya Kozyreva.[3]  Aside from what in Europe would be considered innocuous criticism of government, Kozyreva was charged with hanging a quote from the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko’s poem ‘Testament’ to his monument in St. Petersburg:

“Oh bury me, then rise ye up / And break your heavy chains / And water with the tyrants’ blood / The freedom you have gained.”[4]

Like the Muscovy Princes, Tsars and Soviet Premiers before him, Putin has not brooked criticism or dissent well.  A whole generations of Russians and those coming of age today have never really known a leader other than Putin.  Replacing Yeltsin, who left office in 1999, except for term of office served by Dmitry Medvedev as President with Putin taking a turn as Prime Minister to meet Constitutional requirements, Putin has been firmly entrenched in power for 25 years and 75 days as of the writing of this chapter.[5]   

The Russian Orthodox Church has been much the same.  Except for the period between 1917-1992 under Patriarch Tikhon, the Russian Orthodox Church has either been a direct creature of the State (1721-1917), or, chose to voluntarily subordinate itself to the Soviet State (1926-1991).  The most senior hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church today, including the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill and Metropolitan Onufriy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) had to be approved by the KGB in order to be ordained bishop. 

There is solid evidence in the public domain they were all Soviet collaborators.[6]  In all, in the past 300-years, the Russian Orthodox Church could only have been considered a Church free of State control for a mere 5 years in that interregnum between the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II Alexandrovich and the rise of the Soviet government in 1922.

The total giving-over of itself to the Russian State has seemingly denied the Russian Orthodox Church any ability at introspective discernment.  It is fair to ask if, having been voluntarily enslaved to the Russian State for centuries, whether it understands how to function as a Church as Europe and the world would understand one.  Enduring evidence of the hierarchs and clergy continuing to function as part of the Russian State security apparatus indicates there is little interest or inclination to engage in critical self-thought.  The willingness Moscow Patriarchate aligned clergy to act in ways that can rightly be considered spies continues to challenge Europe’s liberal democratic values and tradition of being disinclined to regulate the activities of churches and faith communities.

In Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Sweden and elsewhere in Europe, Russian Orthodox clergy, including hierarchs, have been arrested and/or expelled as persona non grata for their roles in subterfuge.  This has included spying on NATO bases, collecting detailed engineering information about essential water treatment facilities, covertly recording conversations with foreign governments, diplomats, funding election interference activities, corrupting government officials with bribes and exploiting non-aligned clergy.  The creation and or capture of kompromat used in blackmail operations as part of these activities by Russian Orthodox Church clergy on behalf of the Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation – FSB) constitutes a real and present danger for Europe. 

The difficulty for Europe is not only how it responds – but if it will respond.  Finland’s President, Alexander Stubb observed the insufficiency of Europe’s willingness to adequately address the problem of Russia’s and the Russian Orthodox Church’s revisionism and anti-European behaviour concerning EU policy-making:

“You go through three phases. First, you have a crisis, then you have chaos. And eventually you get a suboptimal solution.”[7]

As Europe is home to countries that once fell under the Russian yoke the consequence of these activities poses real and present dangers for Europe’s security and democratic traditions.  For years, Ukrainians have rightly claimed they are fighting a war so that Europe may not have to do so.  In many ways they are right.  Given all that was discussed and detailed in previous chapters the penchant for Russia continuing to experience elastic borders is not only possible, but likely.  The pundits that once claimed the conflicts in Georgia would be reconciled and Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be returned to Georgian control have sung a different tune since

Putin has shown no interest in the restoration of any Russian occupied territories being returned to their countries’ internationally recognised borders.  Consider the 2016 exchange between Putin and a young Russian boy.  At a carefully managed televised awards ceremony for geography students the following exchange occurred:

[Putin]  “Where does Russia’s border end?”

[Boy]    “At the Bering Strait!”

[Putin]  “It doesn’t end anywhere.” 

Realising the implied threat and policy declaration the audience was momentarily stunned into silence.  With a theatric timing only the finest actors possess Putin then quipped:

[Putin]   “That was a joke!” [8]

The crowd erupted in laughter and applause.  Intelligence experts, policy analysts and leaders in the world capitals, however, shivered.  Russian conduct since has shown it was no joke.

In that singular exchange Putin appealed to the inalienable intersection of the Russkiy Mir and Holy Rus’ in the hearts and minds of the Russian people.  There are reasons Russians accept the despotism the rest of Europe does not.  After suffering post-independence malaise, poverty, economic and cultural banditry which created an aggressive oligarch class, most Russians yearned for a reason to enjoy the pride of yesteryear.  Putin gave it to them and did so often – although not always substantively.  With symbolic parades and other ephemeral accoutrements of Russia’s former glory Putin appealed to populist enthusiasm and frenzy.  Putin’s exchange with the child served its purpose.  He projected the idea that Russia is so invincible it can do as it wishes and simultaneously began to plant the idea he intended to re-establish what had once been a greater Russian empire. 

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Citations
[1] Geoffrey Hosking, “Russia: People and Empire 1552-1917”, Harvard University Press, 30 September 1998.
[2] Miriam Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, “Putin versus Civil Society: Outlawing the Opposition”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 24, Issue 3, July 2013.
[3] Staff Writers, “Russia: Activist Daria Kozyreva conviction for poetic anti-war protest exposes continued repression”, Amnesty International, 18 April 2025.
[4] Тарас Шевченко, “Заповіт”, Київ: Видавництво Глорія, 2020.
[5] By comparison, Fidel Castro served as Head of State in Cuba for 31 years, 2 months and 22 days – only six years longer than Putin.  Changes demanded by Putin to the Russian Constitution on 4 July 2020 (by coincidence, American ‘Independence Day’) now allow Putin to serve as President for life.
[6] Roman Skakun, “The NKVD–MGB–KGB Agent Network in the Orthodox Episcopate of Ukraine (1939–1964): Formation, Functions, and Behavioral Models”, Ukrainian Catholic University Press: Lviv, 2025.
[7] Juraj Majcin, “Russia’s threat to Europe goes beyond the battlefields of Ukraine”, European Policy Centre, 28 January 2025.
[8] Staff Writers, “Russia’s border doesn’t end anywhere, Vladimir Putin says”, BBC News, 24 November 2016.