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Insights
The thrust of this manuscript is the threat posed by the Russian Orthodox Church to European Security and Democracy. It would be both impossible and imprudent not to address the esse of Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian State in both history and modernity in so doing. This requires an examination of the inextricably intertwined doctrinal concepts of the русский мир (Russkiy Mir – Russian World) and its religious counterpart in Russian Orthodox Christianity, Святая Русь (Holy Rus’). The interrelatedness of the Russkiy Mir and the Holy Rus’ concepts in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church and in-turn, its role as a quasi-State agency within the Russian Federation security apparatus and propaganda machine,[1] will necessarily be explored.
The idea of the Russkiy Mir lies at the heart of the driving ideology requiring a unity of Russian military, political and cultural superiority within the Russian sphere. The Russian Orthodox Church, that singular institution that survived Russian Tsardom and the Soviet Union into the modern Russian Federation was unique in its ability to permeate and provide continuity in perpetuating the military, political and cultural traditions for the average Russian. Unique in its span of Russian history and institutions, the Russian Orthodox Church alone was capable of sustaining the concept of the Russkiy Mir with its unique philosophical construct of the Holy Rus’ throughout Russia’s turbulent history.
If follows then that the Russian Orthodox Church, led by the Moscow Patriarchate, was pursued by the emerging politicians of the neophyte Russian Federation to create the Russkiy Mir as its very continuity in the dark days of the founding of the modern Russian State. At that time, the Russian Orthodox Church provided the only stable aspect of Russian society. In equal measure, the Moscow Patriarchate quickly realised it would benefit from its idiosyncratic relationship with the Russian State to realise the telos of the Holy Rus’.
A historic analysis of the early days of the leadership of both the Russian Federation and Moscow Patriarch reveals that Aleksei Mikhailovich Ridiger, known as Alexy II, Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’, believed he enjoyed a position superior to that of the first democratically elected Russian President, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. The need for Yeltsin to court the favour of the only institution surviving from Tsardom to Communism and into the present, a body representing Russia’s largest single voting bloc, the Russian Orthodox Church, was abundantly evident. Yeltsin’s relatively weak position also rendered the relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarch imperative.
Yeltsin pledged to return church property confiscated during the Soviet era thus ensuring the Alexy II would promote his election through his proxy clergy.[2] The scheme worked. Yeltsin emerged victorious and Alexy II secured his position and that of the Russian Orthodox Church as indispensable power-brokers for the Russian State. By 1996, the symbiotic relationship between the Kremlin and Moscow Patriarchate was complete. The benefits of the Russian State and Russian Orthodox Church combining to reach their non-exclusive goals proved irresistible to the Russian President and Moscow Patriarch. Clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church actively campaigned for Yeltsin’s re-election in pulpits from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.[3] In exchange, the Russian Orthodox Church was given unique access to Russian schools and institutions to the point of excluding other confessions of faith.
Consequently, while this is not a theological treatise, to achieve any real understanding of the why and how the Russian Orthodox Church is a threat to European Security and Democracy it is incumbent upon us to parse the concept of the Holy Rus’ and its relationship to the political agenda of the Russkiy Mir.
The centrality of the Russkiy Mir and Holy Rus’, in the minds of most Russians, comes not only from self-awareness acquired by familial, religious and cultural inheritance alone. What is learned at home and in the church is reinforced and enhanced by politicised State propaganda, policy and construct. The neo-imperialist school engineered the doctrine of the Russkiy Mir as the dogmata generalia of the military, political and social ideal of all Russians. Likewise, the Russian Orthodox Church has developed the Holy Rus’ concept as its dogmata specialia.
It was not by chance that in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin created a government-funded vehicle to project Russia’s soft power both domestically and internationally giving it the name the Russkiy Mir Foundation. The goals and reach of the foundation are rooted in the core missions of its founding bodies – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation.
Unsurprisingly, the Russkiy Mir is projected worldwide in various means and domestically through traditional and cultural curriculum heavily influenced by the Russian Orthodox as enshrined in Holy Rus’ doctrine. Any critical observer of Russia’s conduct in their illegal occupations in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine can easily point to Russia’s invocation of language and cultural deprivation coupled with supposed discrimination of the Russian Orthodox Church as cassis belli to achieve their military, political and cultural goals of creating a new Russian empire.
The Russkiy Mir’s realisation depends on the belief that neighbouring countries and their peoples inherently Russian and must be converted to embrace the doctrine of the Holy Rus’. Russia’s eliminationist policy towards its neighbours’ identities is the natural fruition of the pairing of the Russkiy Mir and Holy Rus’. Only by the Kremlin enjoying suzerainty over their neighbours through military means, by imposing political and cultural influence and ultimately by subjugating their neighbours to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church can Russia’s goals be made complete.
We argue, and there is ample evidence to support our thesis, that the Russian Orthodox Church operates as an organ of Russia’s security apparatus. Through intercepts and intelligence operations it has emerged that the Patriarch of Moscow himself directs his clergy to be disruptive agents on behalf of the Russian State.[4] By venturing beyond the exercise of soft power activities the Russian Orthodox Church has exceeded norms long universally acknowledged and accepted as legitimate cultural and religious activities.
Citations
[1] Marcin Składanowski, Andrjez Szabaciuk and Agnieszka Łukasik-Turecka, “Church of war: propaganda and disinformation in Patriarch Kirill’s discourse on Russia’s aggression”, Cogent Arts & Humanities, 2025.
[2] Alexander Rahr, “Yeltsin Campaigning,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 June 1991.
[3] Alessandra Stanley, “Church Leans Towards Yeltsin in Russian Vote”, New York Times, 30 May 1996.
[4] Nicholas Chkhaidze, “Moscow Uses Russian Orthodox Church as Covert Foreign Policy Tool in Ukraine and the West”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 21, Issue 55, 10 April 2024.